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Abstract. Network intrusion detection is one of the most visible uses
for Big Data analytics. One of the main problems in this application is
the constant rise of new attacks. This scenario, characterized by the fact
that not enough labeled examples are available for the new classes of
attacks is hardly addressed by traditional machine learning approaches.
New findings on the capabilities of Zero-Shot learning (ZSL) approach
makes it an interesting solution for this problem because it has the ability
to classify instances of unseen classes. ZSL has inherently two stages: the
attribute learning and the inference stage. In this paper we propose a new
algorithm for the attribute learning stage of ZSL. The idea is to learn
new values for the attributes based on decision trees (DT). Our results
show that based on the rules extracted from the DT a better distribution
for the attribute values can be found. We also propose an experimental
setup for the evaluation of ZSL on network intrusion detection (NID).
Keywords: Attribute Learning, Network Intrusion Detection, Zero-Shot
Learning
1 Introduction
Nowadays society is becoming increasingly dependent on the use of computer
systems in various fields such as finance, security and many aspects of everyday
life. On the other hand threats and attacks are increasingly growing. Cyber-
Security research area looks at the ability to act pro-actively in order to mit-
igate or prevent attacks. In that sense Network Intrusion Detection (NID) is
one of the (possible) solutions. This task is basically carried out under two ap-
proaches: (i) Missuse Detection and (ii) Anomaly Detection. These approaches
have advantages and disadvantages associated with their suitability to various
scenarios [1]. There are machine learning based solutions to these approaches
[2,3]. Despite the extensive academic research, their deployment in operational
NID environments has been very limited [4]. On the other hand new attacks are
constantly occurring, often as variants of known attacks.
Traditional machine learning approaches are unable to tackle challenging
scenarios in which new classes may appear after the learning stage. This scenario
ar
X
iv
:1
60
7.
08
63
4v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  2
8 J
ul 
20
16
2 Rivero Pe´rez, JL. and Ribeiro, B.
is present many real world situations [5]. Specifically in NID related tasks where
one of the main problems is the emergence of new attacks which corresponds with
new classes. In that case the detection algorithm should identify the new classes
which is important in real environments. Recently, there has been an increasing
interest in the study of ZSL approaches, which might be a possible solution to
this problem [6,7,5]. In this paper we propose an Attribute Learning for Network
Intrusion Detection (ALNID) algorithm. We present the preliminary results as
an initial step prior to the detection of new attacks on networks. A proposal of
the experimental data setup for the application of ZSL in NID is also given. The
proposed attribute learning algorithm can be generalized to many problems.
It is simple and based on criteria such as attributes frequency and entropy,
achieving to learn new values for the original attributes. The results show a
significant improvement in the representation of the attributes for classes. This
is encouraging since we expect to achieve higher accuracy in the inference stage
of ZSL. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II we briefly
review the background, related work on ZSL as well as the attribute learning
prior stage. In Section III we describe the ALNID algorithm. In Section IV we
present the data preprocessing and propose an experimental data setup for the
application of ZSL in NID. In Section V we discuss the results on KDD Cup 99
dataset. Finally, we conclude and address some lines of future work.
2 Zero-Shot Learning
ZSL is inspired by the way human beings are capable of identifying new classes
when a high-level description is provided. It consists of identifying new classes
without training examples, from a high-level description of the new classes (un-
seen classes) that relate them to classes previously learned during the training
(seen classes). This is done by learning the attributes as an intermediate layer
that provides semantic information about the classes to classify. ZSL has two
stages: the training or attribute learning stage in which knowledge about the at-
tributes is captured, and then the inference stage where this knowledge is used
to classify instances among a new set of classes. This approach has been widely
applied to images classification tasks [6,7,5,8]. There are different solutions for
both attribute learning and for the inference stage, which models the relation-
ships among features, attributes, and classes in images. Such strategy makes it
difficult to apply ZSL to other problems. This, coupled with the need of identify
new attacks on computer networks motivated us to development this research.
2.1 Attribute Learning Stage
The attribute learning focuses on learning to recognize several properties from
objects, which allow to learn new classes based only on their description [5].
Recently there have been applications of automatic recognition of attributes on
images [9,10,8]. In [8] the authors propose the extensive Scene UNderstanding
(SUN) database that contains 899 categories and 130, 519 images. The database
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is built by human scene classification using Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT).
The authors firstly defined the attributes and then collected votes from AMT
evaluating the presence or not of the previously defined attributes on each im-
age. The procedure then selected or designed several state-of-art features that
are potentially useful for scene classification. To the best of our knowledge this
approach has never been applied on network intrusion detection.
2.2 Inference Stage
In the inference stage the predicted attributes are combined to infer the classes.
There are basically three approaches [5] for this second stage: k–nearest neigh-
bour (k–NN), probabilistic frameworks [7] and energy function [6,5]. One in-
teresting technique is the cascaded probabilistic framework proposed in [7,10]
where the predicted attributes on the first stage are combined to determine the
most likely target class. It has two variants: the Directed Attribute Prediction
(DAP), in which during the training stage, for each attribute, a probabilistic
classifier is learned. Then, at inference stage the classifiers are used to infer new
classes from their attributes signatures. The other variant is the Indirected At-
tribute Prediction (IAP) which learns a classifier for each training class and then
combines predictions of training and test classes. The third ZSL approach uses
energy function [6,5], which is the same as the penalty function where given x:
data, and v: category vector, the energy function Ew(x, v) = x
′Wv is trained,
with the metric W being Ew(x, v) positive if x = v and negative if x! = v. In [11]
a framework is proposed to predict both seen and unseen classes. Unlike other
approaches this proposal not only classifies unknown classes but also classifies
known classes. In the attribute learning stage they consider the set of all classes
Y during training and testing. Some classes y are available as seen classes in
training data (Ys) and the others are the Zero-Shot classes, without any train-
ing data, as unseen classes (Yu). Then they define W = Ws ∪Wu as the word
vectors for both, seen and unseen classes. All training images x(i) ∈ Xy of a seen
class y ∈ Ys are mapped to the word vector wy. Then, to train this mapping a
two-layer neural network to minimize the following objective function (Equation
1) is trained [11]:
J(Θ) =
∑
y∈Ys
∑
x(i)∈Xy
∥∥∥wy − θ(2)f(θ(1)x(i))∥∥∥2 (1)
Other recent and simple energy function based approach is the ESZSL proposal
[5]. It is based on [6] which models the relationships among features, attributes,
and classes. The authors assume that at training stage there are z classes, which
have a signature composed of a attributes. That signatures are represented in
a matrix S ∈ [0, 1]axz. This matrix contains for each attribute any value in
[0, 1] representing the relationship between each attribute and the classes. How-
ever, how the matrix S is computed is not addressed. The instances available
at training stage are denoted by X ∈ Rdxm, where d is the dimensionality of
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Fig. 1. Zero-Shot Learning for Network Intrusion Detection
the data, and m is the number of instances. The authors also compute the ma-
trix Y ∈ {−1, 1}mxz to denote to which class belongs each instance. During the
training they compute the matrix V ∈ Rdxa as in Equation 2:
V = (XXT + γI)−1XY S(SST + λI)−1 (2)
In inference stage they distinguish between a new set of z′ classes by their at-
tributes signatures, S′ ∈ [0, 1]axz′ . Then, given a new instance x the prediction
is given by Equation 3:
arg max
i
(xTV S′i) (3)
3 Proposed Attribute Learning Algorithm
Most of the attribute learning algorithms have been implemented for automatic
recognition of attributes on images based on the features extraction [9,10,8]. It is
hardly applicable to other kind of problems like NID. Firstly we evaluate different
machine learning algorithms on the preprocessed dataset (which is described in
next section) and the C45 decision tree algorithm shows the higher classification
accuracy of 99.54%. This result together the lack of attribute learning algorithms
for non computer vision related tasks leads us to think in the extracted rules
as a solution to build or relearn the attributes. This method could be extended
not only to cover a wider area of Information Technology security but also to
different kind of problems with labeled and structured data in which the C45
algorithm could be applied with good results.
Our proposal is for the Attribute Learning Stage of the ZSL approach de-
picted in Figure 1. ALNID - Attribute Learning for Network Intrusion Detection
Algorithm - is a rule-based algorithm which weights the attributes according its
entropy and frequency in the rules. We begin with a set of X instances composed
of A = {a1, · · · , an} attributes. For each an ∈ A we compute the quantity of in-
formation (I), the entropy (E) and the information gain (G). With these values
we compute the C45 algorithm for decision trees. Furthermore, during each it-
eration we record how many times each ai ∈ A attribute is evaluated by each
rule of the set R = {r1, · · · , rm}. This is what we call frequency. Then, a new
set of attributes A′ = {a′1, · · · , a′n} is created. The values of A′ are the frequency
ALNID: Attribute Learning for Network Intrusion Detection. 5
count, increasing by each time that an attribute is evaluated by the rule rm.
As output the algorithm returns the set of new valued instances X ′ = {A′i}Ni=1
composed of the learned attributes, where N is the number of instances. The
pseudo-code of the proposed method is listed below:
{attributes weighted w.r.t. their frequency in each rule match};
X: Examples, A: Attributes (Input)
X’: Examples with learned attributes (Output)
var
I: Quantity of information
E: Entropy
G: Information Gain
begin
if all examples are from the same class then
repeat
Weight attribute;
Add examples to X’
until attribute in A
return X’;
else
I = Compute quantity of information of the examples;
repeat
E = Compute the entropy of attribute;
G = Compute the information gain of attribute;
until attribute in A
a = attribute that maximizes G;
v = value of a;
Delete a from A;
Generate a root node for the attribute a;
Weight attribute;
Add examples to X’
repeat
ALNID (examples from X with a == v, A);
generate a new branch with a==v;
until partition in Partitions generated by values of attribute a
return X’;
end.
4 Data and Experimental Setup
KDD Cup 991 is the most used in research as data to test and compare intrusion
detection algorithms. It contains about 5 millions of instances representing 39
1 KDD Cup is the annual Data Mining and Knowledge Discovery competition orga-
nized by ACM Special Interest Group on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining.
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Table 1. Data Setup for Zero-Shot Learning on Network Intrusion Detection
Class Nr. of Examples Zero-Shot Class Category
smurf 280,790 no DOS (D)
neptune 107,201 no DOS (D)
back 2203 no DOS (D)
teardrop 979 yes DOS (D)
pod 264 no DOS (D)
land 21 yes DOS (D)
normal 97,277 no NORMAL (N)
satan 1589 no PROBE (P)
ipsweep 1247 yes PROBE (P)
portsweep 1040 no PROBE (P)
nmap 231 yes PROBE (P)
warezclient 1020 no R2L (R)
guess passwd 53 yes R2L (R)
warezmaster 20 no R2L (R)
imap 12 yes R2L (R)
ftp write 8 no R2L (R)
multihop 7 no R2L (R)
phf 4 no R2L (R)
spy 2 no R2L (R)
buffer overflow 30 no U2R (U)
rootkit 10 yes U2R (U)
loadmodule 9 no U2R (U)
perl 3 yes U2R (U)
types of attacks which are grouped into 4 categories and also one category for
normal traffic. Some preprocessing variants applied on the dataset are based on
the reduction of the classes replacing the attack labels by their corresponding
categories, thus reducing the number of classes to 5 [1]. Each instance represents a
TCP/IP connection composed of 41 attributes both quantitative and qualitative
2. Despite our proposal holds for the attribute learning stage, we propose herein
a scheme to apply ZSL approach in NID tasks (see Figure 1). Table 1 shows that
classes such as spy and perl have 2 and 3 instances respectively while classes
as smurf and normal have 280,790 and 97,277 respectively. Then, considering
the study in [1] we selected the 12 attributes from the original 41 ones. Its
statistical description are shown in Table 2. We modified the dataset using the
five categories as classes. Later, for each category we selected two attacks as
Zero-Shot classes. Table 1 illustrates these values and the Zero-Shot classes.
This setup is very practical for the application at hand because we can classify
the Zero-Shot classes. In this case, new attacks can be classified in the categories
to which they belong to.
2 Current research uses a small portion that represents the 10% of the original dataset
containing 494, 021 instances.
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5 Results and Discussion
The ALNID algorithm was evaluated on the preprocessed dataset computing
a DT of 132 leaves and 263 rules (R = {r1, ..., r263}). The classification accu-
racy for the seen classes was 99.94%. Table 2 summarizes the minimum, max-
Table 2. Statistical description of the attributes
Attributes Minimum Maximum Mean StdDev
duration 0 58,329 47.979 707.747
duration’ 0 3 0.013 0.117
protocol type 1 3 2.189 0.961
protocol type’ 0 1 0.845 0.362
src bytes 0 693,375,640 3025.616 988,219.101
src bytes’ 0 7 0.762 1.526
dst bytes 0 5155,468 868.531 33,040.035
dst bytes’ 0 3 0.057 0.297
urgent 0 3 0 0.006
urgent’ 0 1 0 0.016
count 0 511 332.286 213.147
count’ 1 4 1.821 0.425
srv count 0 511 292.907 246.323
srv count’ 0 2 0 0.017
same srv rate 0 1 0.792 0.388
same srv rate’ 0 1 0.784 0.411
dst host count 0 255 232.471 64.745
dst host count’ 0 2 0.033 0.238
dst host srv count 0 255 188.666 106.04
dst host srv count’ 0 3 0.21 0.469
dst host same srv rate 0 1 0.754 0.411
dst host same srv rate’ 0 1 0.024 0.154
dst host same src port rate 0 1 0.602 0.481
dst host same src port rate’ 0 3 0.585 0.779
imum, mean and standard deviation values for each of the original attributes
and the learned ones by our proposal. The Figure 2 depicts the distribution per
class of the original attribute values (A = {a1, ..., a12}) and the learned ones
(A′ = {a′1, ..., a′12}). These were listed by decreasing order of the entropy (E)
of the learned attributes. In general the graphical plots show better separated
distributions per class for the learned attributes with our proposal than for the
originals ones. The learned attribute duration’ in Figure 2(a) and (b) improves
distribution at least w.r.t. one class, e.g. the NORMAL (N) one. The rest of
the learned attributes by ALNID achieves a higher separability than the origi-
nal ones in their distribution regarding the classes (see Figure 2(c)–(x )). This
new representation of the learned attributes are expected to improve the k–NN
classification during the inference stage. Also we found a way to compute the
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(a) duration (b) duration’
(c) protocol type (d) protocol type’
(e) src bytes (f) src bytes’
(g) dst bytes (h) dst bytes’
(i) urgent (j) urgent’
(k) count (l) count’
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(m) srv count (n) srv count’
(o) sam srv rate (p) sam srv rate’
(q) dst host count (r) dst host count’
(s) dst host srv count (t) dst host srv count’
(u) dst host same srv rate (v) dst host same srv rate’
(w) dst host same port rate (x) dst host same port rate’
Fig. 2. Original (left) and learned (right) attributes.
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signature matrix S ∈ [0, 1]axz required by the energy function used in the in-
ference approach in [5]. The range of values of the learned attributes is discrete
which can easily be integrated in the inference stage.
6 Conclusions
ZSL is a two-stage approach that addresses the classification of new classes
without any example during the training. This, joined with the need to detect
new attacks on traffic networks motivated us to research in the application of ZSL
to NID. In this paper we proposed ALNID, a new algorithm for the attribute
learning stage of ZSL. The algorithm builds a DT and combines entropy and
frequency of the original attributes in a weighted function setting. Our evaluation
proposal on KDD Cup 99 dataset showed better distribution of the attribute
values per class. The class separability is convenient for the inference stage based
on k–NN. Future work will extend the work to the inference stage based on the
learned attributes by this proposal and will validate ZSL to other NID Big Data.
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